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Dahl: Defamation and the First Amendment: Editorial Process Found Privi

DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
EDITORIAL PROCESS FOUND
"PRIVILEGED" IN HERBERT V. LANDO
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question of the sanctity of the editorial process and its protec-

tion from judicial inquiry under the first amendment in defamation
cases has received little attention from either the courts or the commen-

tators.1 However, this subject was recently considered by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Herbert v. Lando,2 a case of national
first impression

The court characterized it as having "broad implica-

tions" 4 and as breaking "new ground in an area of utmost importance." 5 The issue before the court was whether, and to what extent, a

public figure bringing an action for libel may inquire into an editor's
thoughts, beliefs, opinions, and conclusions held at the time he was pre-

paring for publication.6
The fact that this question has not arisen before, in light of the

United States Supreme Court's standard for defamation of a public
figure laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 is notable.
Under the dictates of that decision, a public figure plaintiff must show

that the alleged defamation was made with actual malice.'

In this con-

I. See generally Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REv. 422 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Anderson]; Eaton, TheAmerican Law ofDefamationthrough Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. And Beyond An AnalyticalPrimer,61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Comment, Calculated
Misstatementsof Fact Not Protected by FirstAmendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press,
1969 UTAH L. Rv. 118 [hereinafter cited as CalculatedMisstatements Not Protected].
2. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
3. Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
4. 568 F.2d at 975.
5. Id. at 984.
6. Id. at 974.
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Justice Douglas has criticized the New York Times standard as
inadequate and unworkable. He argued:
If the common law tests had been too elusive to protect First Amendment interests then
the actual-malice test has proved neither to be more precise nor to be a better guardian.
Proof of knowledge that a statement is false requires slippery proof of a mental state, as
does a showing of reckless disregard. Seldom is evidence clear on these issues and a local
jury asked to "weigh all the circumstances" can continue under this evanescent test to
penalize unpopular speech.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 902 (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 438
F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971).
8. This is distinguished from common law malice which involves ill motive or evil intent.
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text, actual malice means that the defendant either had knowledge that

the publication was false or acted with "reckless disregard" for whether
it was true.9 Such a state of mind requirement would first seem to
permit inquiry into subjective editorial motives in order to determine
one's actual knowledge of falsehood; while, the latter "reckless disregard" portion of the test may be interpreted as an objective probation. 10
However, Herbert establishes an absolute first amendment privilege
against disclosure of a journalist's exercise of editorial control and
judgment."
The Second Circuit offered alternative theories to support the advancement of an editorial privilege. First, it asserted that selective ju-

dicial inquiry into the thought processes of an editor presented an
impermissible chilling effect upon the first amendment freedom of the
press. 12 The court found that the press did not merely mirror and
mimic the world at large. Rather, it was concluded that the acts of
gathering, processing, and disseminating the myriad of daily events,3
necessarily required that numerous editorial judgments be made.'
The court noted that if those judgments were susceptible to selective
inquiry and analysis by a plaintiff allegedly defamed, editors would be
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 113, 118 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The New York Times
decision has been generally well received. But it has also been characterized as the sort of ringing
pronouncement that might have been expected of a young nation shortly after the revolution
wherein a climate would be encouraged which would permit the infant press to grow. Indeed, the
press has grown to such proportions that in many cases it rivals the corporate giants in influence,
strength, and resources. Hence, given the ability to distribute among its constituents the costs of
defamation, some have questioned the utility of sweeping protections for the press preferring to
apply a strict liability. Such proponents believe that people's eagerness for news would permit
them to pay more for it from which the press would distribute the costs of defamation with a
minimum of self-censorship. Shapo, MediaInjuries To Personality:An Essay on Legal Regulation
of Public Communication,46 Tax. L. REV. 650, 656-57 (1968); see generally Cohen, .4 New Niche
for the Fault Princ7le:A ForthcomingNewsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 371 (1970).
10. See notes 68-105 infra and accompanying text.
11. 568 F.2d at 974. At common law, two defenses, or, more precisely, privileges, developed
to balance the benefits of free speech against the harm to reputation. An absolute privilege was
bestowed upon the participants of legislative, administrative, and judicial proceedings for expeditious reasons realizing the possibility of defamatory statements. Secondly, a qualified privilege
existed which conditioned immunity upon such considerations as a reasonable manner of publication, a proper purpose, and the like. It applied to defamatory statements in material published
for the protection of legitimate interests or to one capable of acting in that interest, reports of
public proceedings, fair comment on matters of public concern, and even good faith falsehoods.
CalculatedMisstatementsNot Protected,supra note 1, at 118-19 n.5. See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 8, §§ 114-115; Recent Decisions, Libel-ConstitutionalPrivilege-WhyNot an Absolute Pri.vi
lege?-Rosenbloom Doctrine in Washington, 7 GONZAGA L. REy. 344 (1972).
12. 568 F.2d at 984. See notes 27-51 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 27-38 infra and accompanying text.
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chilled in the very function of their duties, and this the first amendment
would not permit. 4
In the alternative, the court looked to the structure of the first
amendment and the seeming redundancy of granting a freedom specifically to the press even though the guarantee of freedom of speech
would certainly apply as well to the press without the need to mention
it specifically. 5 From this premise it was reasoned that the constitutional framers intended the press to serve a special function akin to a
fourth branch of government, albeit removed thereform. 16 As such, it
would acquire and require a privilege similar to that of the administrabranches of government in order to adetive, legislative, and judicial
17
quately fulfill its role.
The adoption of this privilege by the Second Circuit is significant
in that it expands upon first amendment protections, although it does
present a dilemma under the New York Times actual malice test. It
would seem at first blush'that the knowing falsehood requirement is
thwarted if inquiry into opinions, thoughts, beliefs, and conclusions of
an editor is precluded. Although the Second Circuit did not address
this conflict in its holding, it is submitted that the decision is reconcilable with the New York Times rule while providing an additional safeguard for press freedom. The United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on the question,' 8 and its opinion should provide additional clarification of the requirements necessary to establish defamation under New York Times. Accordingly, an analysis of the decision
of the Second Circuit follows. It is concluded that the holding is
sound, consistent with New York Times, and that the Supreme Court
should affirm.

II.

THE HERBERT

Case

The action for defamation was brought by former Army Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert against Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., its news correspondent Mike Wallace, and its news producer
Barry Lando. There was no dispute that Herbert was a public figure 19
14. 568 F.2d at 984. See notes 63-105 infra and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 988.
16. Id.
17. See generally Stewart, Or ofthe Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Stewart] and notes 106-16 infra and accompanying text.
18. Herbert v. Lando, 98 S.Ct. 1483 (1978).
19. 568 F.2d at 979 n.15, 985 n.2.
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within the meaning of CurtisPublishingCo. v. Bults. 0 Herbert was the
subject of much publicity in the early 1970's following his charge that
his superior officers engaged in war crimes and atrocities in Vietnam.
Relieved of his command, he soon retired stating that he had been harrassed into doing so by the Army as a direct result of his disclosures.
Herbert recounted his experiences in a book, Soldier.
In February, 1973, in a segment of its "60 Minutes" series, Columbia Broadcasting System aired a program entitled "The Selling of
Colonel Herbert" which cast doubt upon the veracity of the colonel's
allegations and generally portrayed him in a disfavorable light. 2 '
Thereafter, Herbert filed suit for defamation charging that Lando, as
news producer, had "deliberately distorted the record through selective
investigation, 'skillful' editing, and one-sided interviewing," 2 alleging
damages to his reputation and the impairment of his book as literary
property in excess of forty-four million dollars. The deposition of
Lando covered twenty-six sessions over a period of more than a year
and involved 2903 pages of transcript and 240 exhibits. Lando balked,
however, regarding questions concerning his beliefs, opinions, intent,
and conclusions held when preparing the program,23 claiming that the
first amendment immunized his thought processes from discovery.
The trial court, observing the issue to be one of first impression,
ordered Lando to respond to the questions. The court concluded that
the necessarily subjective nature of the libel standard justified a broad
and unrestricted inquiry into a journalist's state of mind 24 Referring
to the "critical importance of the issue,"2 the Second Circuit granted
20. 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967).
21. Documents already obtained through discovery indicate that Lando's stated premise was

that Herbert was a liar and that Lando would not do the story at all unless he could debunk
Herbert, convincingly portray him as the "bad guy" and destroy his credibility. 568 F.2d at 993

n.30.
22. Id. at 982.
23. Id. at 982-83. The questions were grouped into five categories as follows:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or leads
to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the "60 Minutes" segment and

the Atlantic Monthly article [which Lando had written, also a subject of the suit];
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind with
respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded
from the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain mate-

rial.
24. 73 F.R.D. at 394-96.
25. 568 F.2d at 983.
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an immediate interlocutory review.2 6
III. ANALYSIS
The Role of the Press. Finding an EditorialPrivilege

The court initiated its review of the first amendment and its application to defamation with the premise that an unrestrained press plays
a vital role in the marketplace of ideas and the survival of a democ-

racy.

7

The function of the press28 was viewed as a tripartite operation

which involved (1) the acquisition of information, (2) the processing of

that information, and (3) its dissemination through publication. 9 The
Supreme Court has been aware that any break in this chain results in
cutting off the free flow of information. 0
The court discussed news dissemination in light of the criteria established by a number of prior cases, 3 1 finding that the Supreme Court

had zealously guarded the right of the press to distribute news without
the fettering of prior restraints. The first stage, the right of the press to
gather information, was viewed as logically antecedent to the effective

exercise of the right of news distribution.32 Protection of this exercise

26. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
27. Id. at 975, citingGarrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); A. MEiKLEjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT 88-89 (1948):
The primary social fact which blocks and hinders the success of our experiment in selfgovernment is that our citizens are not educated for self-government. We are terrified
by ideas, rather than challenged and stimulated by them. Our dominant mood is not the
courage of people who dare to think. It is the timidity of those who fear and hate
whenever conventions are questioned ...
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is Absolute, MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT 48, 54
(1971) reprintedfrom THE SUPREME REVIEW, 253 (1961).
28. The term "press" rather than "media" is used herein because reference is intended to
cover legitimate news operations of all forms. The term media, being broader, includes numerous
forms of expression beyond the scope of this article. That "press" includes the broadcast media is
established. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).
29. 568 F.2d at 976.
30. Id See also Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, Freedom of Informatior: The Statute and the Regulations, 56
GEORGETOWN L.J. 56 (1967).
31. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) ("gag" orders permissible only
in extreme circumstances); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (no
prior restraints); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (tax on newspaper
advertisements graduated to reflect circulation struck down); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931) (prior restraint of the press is impermissible).
32. 568 F.2d at 977, citing Note, The Right of the Press to GatherInformation, 71 COL. L.
REv. 838 (1971). But see Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (the press has no
constitutional right to information the access to which is not generally available).
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of freedom of the press has sometimes been used to permit journalists
to conceal the identity of confidential sources under certain circumstances.33 The court expressed concern that the flow of information
would be inhibited if confidential sources remained silent through fear
that their identities would be revealed. 31 It cannot be said, however,

that any general, or even conditional, constitutional privilege exists. 35
It was concluded that the "constitutional protections afforded the
dissemination and acquisition of information has [sic] inevitably led
the Supreme Court to recognize that the editorial process must equally
be safeguarded. ' 36 The court correctly observed that the press is not a
mere conduit of raw information senselessly spewed forth. Rather,
throughout the steps of acquisition, processing, and dissemination of
information, there was the active utilization of human judgment, characterized as the editorial process. 37 This judgment, however, is part of

the state of mind wherein actual malice must be found, if at all, and,
hence, the quandary of the court in Herbert.3"
The court relied upon two recent Supreme Court decisions in de-

termining that protections of the editorial process abide in the first
amendment: Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornillo3 9 and Columbia
BroadcastingSystem v. Democratic National Committee.4" Both cases

deal with statutes or regulations which purported to specify what a
newspaper or broadcasting station had to print or say, and held that
33. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), cited by the court, in fact required a reporter to
reveal his sources. The sources were protected, however, in Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.,
66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (where it was not shown that the information was not available
from other sources) and Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1972) (where the confidential source was of questionable materiality and the information
could be obtained by other means). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 43638 (10th Cir. 1977); Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co,, 98 Idaho 288,-, 562 P.2d 791, 801 (1977);
Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing PrivilegeforNewsmen, 26 HASTINOS L.J. 709
(1975); Comment, Newsmen's Privilege Against Compulsory Disclosure of Sources in Civil
Suits-Towardan Absolute Privilege?, 45 U. COLO. L. REv.173 (1973).
34. 568 F.2d at 978.
35. See ag., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974)
and Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (both involving
allegedly libelous statements based on confidential sources). See also Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d
974, 996 (2d Cir. 1977) (Miskill, J., dissenting); W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 115.
36. 568 F.2d at 978.
37. Id. A journal does not merely print facts, it sets them in context. It involves interpretation and selection and even editorial suppression. The state cannot dictate that an editor abstain
from discrimination in the news without dictating selection. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 n.24 (1974).
38. The interlocutory nature of this appeal should not be forgotten. All the cases upon which
the court is forced to rely are appeals from final judgments on the merits, hence, analogies must be
drawn to apply to pre-trial discovery.
39. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (newspaper could not be compelled to accept editorial replies).
40. 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters not required to accept paid advertisements).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss4/22

6

Dahl: Defamation and the First Amendment: Editorial Process Found Privi

1978]

"PRIVILEGED"EDITORIAL PROCESS

such an intrusion upon editorial judgment was impermissible. 4 1
In Tornillo, the Court found that a compulsory "right to reply"
statute was an intrusion into the functions of editors which failed to
clear first amendment barriers. The Court observed the following as to
editorial function:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the
paper and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time.42
The press is not a public utility subject to "reasonable" governmental
regulation in matters affecting editorial judgment, and the Court remains intensely skeptical about those measures that would allow the
43
government to intrude into the editorial rooms of this nation's press.
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National

Committee,4 it was noted that "for better or worse, editing is what
editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of material." 45 Certainly the editorial decision must reside somewhere, and wherever that
may be it is subject to abuse.' In another case, in upholding a bar
41. The trial court summarily dismissed these cases as having "nothing to do with the boundaries of pre-trial discovery in a defamation suit alleging malicious publication." 73 F.R.D. at 396.
This is erroneously quoted as "malicious prosecution" in Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 983 n.21
(2d Cir. 1977).
42. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
43. Id. at 259. Mr. Justice White, in a concurring opinion in Tornillo, is adamant that while
the press is not always accurate, fair or even responsible, that is a risk society must take. Id. at
260. It is an elementary proposition of the first amendment that government may not compel a
newspaper "to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom
floor." "[W]e have never thought that the first amendment permitted public officials to dictate to
the press the contents of its news columns or the slant of its editorials." Id. at 261. But Mr.
Justice White also defends a citizen's right to an action for libel. The citizen may not force the
press to tell his side of the story or even to print a retraction, yet he should have a remedy for
falsehood. Id. at 261-62. It is a "near absurdity to so deprecate individual dignity ... and to
leave the people at the complete mercy of the press, at least in this stage of our history when the
press ... is steadily becoming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred by threats of
libel suits." Id. at 263. For a persuasive argument contra Mr. Justice White's last contention, see
Anderson, supra note 1, at 430-41.
44. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
amendment] guarantee gives every newspaper the liberty to
45. Id. at 124. "[T]hat [first
print what it chooses and reject what it chooses, free from the intrusive editorial thumb of Government." Id. at 145 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original).
46. "From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest
somewhere-wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 345 (1816).
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against stating male and female preferences in employment advertising,
the Supreme Court was careful to reaffirm, without equivocation, the
protection afforded to editorial judgment and to free expression of
views on any issue, however controversial.47
The dangers posed by supplanting editorial judgment with judicial
judgment are clearly illustrated by Sprouse v. Clay Communications
Inc.48 There the court objected to the choice of certain headline words
which it deemed misleading, as well as the size of the type in which
they were set. Even though the stories were true and the court cited no
evidence of any intention by the newspaper to mislead readers or injure
the plaintiff, the court imposed substantial liability.49 The holding, in
effect, stated that first amendment protections extended only to journalistic styles of which judges approve and not to members of the press
who use intemperate terms or headlines which a given judge may think
too large.5 This is typical of the meddling which the Herbert court
seeks to prevent through the protection of the first amendment.5 '
Defamation of a Public Figure
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 2 first applied constitutional principles to the realm of common law defamation and held that a public
official may vindicate his reputation in an action for libel if he is able to
establish that the statements involved were known to be false or made
in reckless disregard for the truth.53 The public official concept was
later expanded to cover public figures,54 followed by an extention to
47. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973). While this
case was not cited by Judge Kaufman, it lends further credence to the sanctity of the editorial
domain. See also Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, -,366 N.E.2d 1299,
1308, 397 N.Y.S.2d. 943, 952 (1977) (following the lead of Tornillo) and Associates & Aldrich Co.
v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming newspaper's editorial rights over
paid advertisements).
48. 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 882 (1975).
49. Id. at 682. The court reduced the award from $750,000 to $250,000. Id. at 692-93.
50. Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue is Control of Press Power, 54
Tax. L. Rev. 271, 280 (1976). "[Pjermitting judges and juries to decide what the press may or may
not publish, on pain of paying a libel judgment, is governmental control of the press, just as surely
as would be a system permitting the executive to prohibit publication upon pain of paying a fine."
Id. at 271.
51.

"It is.

.

.manifest that the vitality of the editorial process can be sapped.

. .

if we are

not vigilant. The unambiguous wisdom of Tornill and CBS is that we must encourage, and
protect against encroachment, full and candid discussion within the newsroom itself." 568 F.2d
at 979.
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L.
Rev. 143, 201-05 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 43 N.C. L. REv. 315 (1965).
53. Id. at 279-80.
54. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-65, 170-72 (1967) (football coach). See
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include discussion and communication involving all matters of public
56
concern. 5

The scope was restricted by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.

57
such that the "public or general interest" test was found wanting
where a private citizen has not voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of a public issue or engaged the public's attention therein to influence the outcome.5 8
The actual malice test remains firmly in force, and a highly subjective inquiry into the defendant's state of mind is necessary to satisfy the
59
formula. It is an elusive and abstract concept difficult of application,
and requires knowledge of falsehood or a high degree of awareness of
probable falsehood, such that intent to harm is shown.60 The court in
Herbert noted two recent decisions which held that expressions of personal opinions are vital to vigorous debate and not the basis for recovery in a libel action61 and that a newspaper is incapable of libel for
neutral reportage of newsworthy material.62
The foregoing, then, sets the stage for the Herbertcourt's determination that procedures in libel actions must be narrowly defined so as
to least conflict with the hallowed principle of robust and uninhibited
also Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (prominant real estate
broker); Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 499 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974) (black actor); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (retired professional
basketball player); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir. 1970) (author of book on
avoiding probate). Held not to be public figures were, e.g., a corporate brokerage firm dealing in
bricks and tiles, Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 909
(1971) and a neighborhood pharmacist, Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649

(D.C. Cir. 1966).

55. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-45 (1971) (plurality opinion) (distributor of nudist magazines). See generally Medina v. Time, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. Mass. 1970)
(killing unarmed civilians in Vietnam); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.
Ga. 1969) (accommodations prices during a golf tournament); United Medical Laboratories, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,394 U.S. 921 (1969)
(mail order business of medical testing laboratory). For an analysis of cases through
Rosenbloom, see Keeton, Some Implications ofthe ConstitutionalPrivilege to Defame, 25 VAND. L.
R v. 59 (1972); Comment, The Expanding Protectionforthe News Mediafrom LiabilityforDefamation:Predictabilityand the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547 (1972).
56. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law-Media Freedom of Speech and
Press-Defamation,1974 Wis. L. REv. 1167.
57. 418 U.S. 323, 337-39 (1974).
58. Id. at 351-52. For a well-reasoned proposed reformation ofthe law of defamation which
would eliminate the public/private distinction for plaintiffs and the media/non-media classification for defendants giving the constitutional qualified privilege to all, see Yasser, Defamation as a
ConstitutionalTort: Wth ActualMaliceforAll, 12 TuLSA L.J. 601, 619-26 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Yasser].
59. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
60. Silbowitz v. Lepper, 55 Misc. 2d 443, -, 285 N.Y.S.2d. 456, 459 (Sup. Ct. 1967), citing
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
61. Buckley v. Littel, 538 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
62. Edwards v. National Audubon Soe'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977).
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public debate. Selective review of a journalist's editorial judgments
and thought processes would endanger a constitutionally protected
realm, and thereby unquestionably put a freeze on the free exchange of
ideas within the newsroom.63 "Indeed," the court concluded, "the ratio decidendi for Sullivan's restraints on libel suits is the concern that
the exercise of editorial judgment would be chiled."'64
It is this editorial process itself which the court was asked to scrutinize. Through discovery, Herbert determined what Lando knew, saw,
said, and wrote during his investigation of Herbert. However, he further pursued an inquiry into Lando's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions which the court refused to permit:
The answers he [Herbert] seeks strike to the heart of the vital
human component of the editorial process. Faced with the
possibility of such an inquisition, reporters and journalists
would be reluctant to express their doubts. Indeed, they
would be chilled in the very process of thought. [Tihe tendency would be to follow the safe course of avoiding contention and controversy-the antithesis of the values fostered by
the First Amendment.
We cannot permit inquiry into Lando's thoughts, opinions and conclusions to consume the very values which the
Sullivan landmark decision sought to safeguard. . . .[Such
an] invasion on [sic] First Amendment rights [holds] grave
implications for the vitality of the editorial process which the
Supreme Court and this court have recognized must be
guarded zealously.6"
The court's logic in defining the chilling effect which such an inquiry would produce is inescapable. However, the court's holding
must be sharply defined to avoid confusion at this point: the court permitted discovery of what an editor knew, said, saw, and wrote-but not
an inquiry into his 'judgmental" process. Further, the court concluded that, from these discoverable facts, the jury would be free to
infer from an editor's use of certain material or his failure to heed contradictory material whether he acted with actual malice." This is the
truly delicate aspect of Herbert. In relying on inferences based upon
63. "'Selective inquiry into the reporter's thoughts can be far worse than the discovery of all
aspects of his mental process. In plumbing only particular facets of the reporter's mind, the libel

plaintiff is more likely to distort the nature of the editorial process." 568 F.2d at 984 n.23.
64. Id. at 980. "mhe lifeblood of the editorial process is human judgment. Thejournalist

must constantly probe and investigate; he must formulate his views and, at every step, question his
conclusions, tentative or otherwise."
65. Id. at 984.
66. Id.

d. at 983-84.
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external facts, the court appears to have adopted an objective test for
actual malice. However, as will be seen in the materials which follow,6' case law indicates that a subjective test of the state of mind is
appropriate. Therefore, it is submitted that the court in Herbert did
not in fact preclude subjective inquiry into an editor's state of mind,
rather it extended first amendment protection only to the editorial
function. This subtle distinction is vital to consistency between this
new privilege and the highly subjective inquiry as to actual malice
which the Supreme Court has required in prior holdings.
The Actual Malice Requirement: Objective vs. Subjective

The New York Times actual malice standard is not synonymous
with the common law concept of malice which involves a sense of spite,
improper motive, ill will or the like.68 Although the "knowing falsehood" element is reasonably straightforward, the element of "reckless
disregard" has never been encompassed within an infallible definition.69 Still, the Supreme Court in St. Amant v. Thompson7 0 makes it
clear that the test is not whether a reasonably prudent person would
have published or would have investigated before publishing. Rather,
there must be sufficient evidence to reach the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. 71 The Court implies that the issue of actual malice focuses on the
defendant's subjective attitudes regarding the truth or falsity of the mafalseterial being published. 72 It is clearly established that innocent
73
hoods are protected under the mantle of the first amendment.
Early Supreme Court decisions discussed both privileged communications74 and statements concerning public officers 75 indicating that
67. See notes 68-105 infra and accompanying text.
68. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
69. Local 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281,
(1974). See also Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Beckley Newspaper
Co. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
70. 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
71. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,731 (1968). See generally Robertson, Defamation
and the FirstAmendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Robertson].
72. See Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
73. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964). See also Time, Inc. v.
Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 292 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971)
(White, J., concurring); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414
F.2d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
74. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1844).
75. Gandia v. Pettingill 222 U.S. 452 (1912).
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such publications were not actionable absent "express malice. 7 6 The
leading decision of Coleman v. MacLennan, 7 cited by the Court in
New York Times, 78 applied the requirement of actual malice in a situa-

tion involving a newspaper attack upon a public figure and candidate
for office. The court in Coleman, through an elucidating examination
of history and precedent, determined that such writings are condition-

ally privileged and the plaintiff must prove malice, defined as "actual
evilmindedness," or fail. 7 9 However, that court held that actual malice
may be sufficiently established through objective externalities.8 0
Calculated falsehoods have been considered by the courts as beyond the pale of first amendment protection. The reasoning is that
honestly believed utterances, even if inaccurate, further the interests of
free speech in the marketplace of ideas, but a lie, knowingly and delib-

erately published, makes no such contribution to the social order. 81
How, then, are determinations of a publisher's knowledge of the falsity
82
of his words or the presence of serious doubts as to their truthfulness
to be made?
As previously indicated,8 3 the actual malice standard appears to
permit both a subjective determination through its knowing falsehood
provision and an objective analysis through its reckless disregard element. 4 Because this bifurcated process causes problems in Herbert,
76. Id. at 457-58. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 291 (1844). Express malice has
been termed actual malice; malice in fact; ill will or wrongful motive; a deliberate intention to
commit an injury, evidenced by externalcircumstances. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (revised
4th ed. 1968) (emphasis added) citing Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (homicide); Weir
v. McEwan, 94 NJ.L. 92, -, 109 A. 355, 356 (1920) (libel); People v. Scalisi, 324 I11.
131, -, 154
N.E. 715, 722 (1926) (homicide).
77. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
78. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-82 (1964). See also the authority
and scholarly opinion cited therein. Id. at 280 n.20.
79. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, -, 98 P. 281, 292 (1908).
80. The court in Coleman proposes an interpretation of the writing, its malignity or intemperance, tending to show recklessness in making the charge; pernicious activity in the publication
or circulation of the statements; their falsity; the situation and relationship of the parties; the facts
and circumstances surrounding the publication; and other evidence appropriate to a charge of bad
motives as in other cases. Inquiry into.the editorial process is not suggested. Id.
81. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942).
82. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968).
83. See notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text.
84. The trial court in Herbert, however, reached the opposite conclusion:
These constitutionally unprotected creatures are obviously of different species.
Knowledge of falsity is a necessary element of the first; that is not so in respect of [sic] the
second. Identification of the first species turns upon an objective question of fact: did
the defendant know the statement was false? Either he did or he did not; ifhe did he is
cast in damages; if he did not, he is exonerated.
The second species of unprotected false statement is at once more subtle, more complex and subjective. The concept of "reckless disregard for the truth" inevitably carries

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss4/22

12

Dahl: Defamation and the First Amendment: Editorial Process Found Privi

1978]

"PRIVILEGED"EDITORIAL PROCESS

some attention must be given to the Supreme Court's approach to the
problem of subjective knowledge in this and similar areas.
In Smith v. California,85 the court ruled that a seller of allegedly
obscene books must be shown to have had subjective knowledge of the
books' content in order to support a conviction. Thus, by eliminating
the burden of self-censorship, public access to the printed word is not
inhibited.86 The Court went further in disavowing a reasonable person
87
standard under the first amendment in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy.
While such a standard admirably serves an essential function of setting
an objective and socially acceptable limit on the freedom of the individual to act in relation to others, it was reasoned that to impose liability on all statements which were deemed "unreasonable" by a jury
would eviscerate the first amendment.88 Indeed, in New York Times
itself the Court indicated that the mere presence of news stories in the
paper's files was insufficient to show that the Times "knew" the advertisement was false. The state of mind required by actual malice would
have to be established subjectively for the persons having responsibility
for publication of the advertisement.89
Ffowever, the Supreme Court has been neither clear nor consistent
in its interpretations and has, on at least one occasion, adopted the objective analysis. In CurtisPublishingCo. v. Butts,9 ° the Court held that
a public figure could recover damages where the substance of the defamatory falsehood makes substantial danger to reputation apparent to
the publisher defendant, thereby indicating an extreme departure from
the standards of investigating and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
the trier of the facts into the thought processes of the defendant: the evaluation and
balancing he made of conflicting information available to him; the misgivings he may
have surpressed when deciding to publish.
73 F.R.D. at 393 (emphasis in the original). The author submits that while the thrust of the
"second species" may be subjective, it is determined through the existence of external evidence
and is therefore an objective standard.
85. 361 U.S. 147 (1959) cited in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).
86. 361 U.S. at 153-54.
87. 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (involving statements made in the course of a political campaign).
88. .d. at 275. For a lower court decision requiring a subjective standard as opposed to
inquiry into what a reasonable publisher would have done, see Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc., 429 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court also points out that reasonable people
might differ as to the amount of time, money, and manpower necessary to verify a fact thereby
increasing litigation. Id. at 178. "'[Reckless disregard of the truth [means] subjective awareness of probable falsity: 'There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."' Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977) (alterations by the court) citing Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 n.6 (1974) quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968).
89. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
90. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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The objective standard has also been

adopted by a number of lower courts in approaching the actual malice
requirement. 92 Similarly, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS embraces this objective approach and suggests that the media should be
judged primarily by professional custom as deduced by expert testimony and that factors under consideration include deadline pressures,
the nature of the interests the defendant was seeking to further, and93the
degree of damage to the reputation or sensibilities of the plaintiff.
Proof of subjective awareness raises evidentiary problems of sub-

stantial magnitude since direct evidence thereof is generally fortuitous,
making capricious results inevitable. 94 On the other hand, inference of

subjective knowledge by the jury is also capricious and exascerbates the
problem of jury discrimination against unpopular publishers, ideas, 95
or plaintiffs. The dilemma presented by Herbert is that subjective inquiry has been limited and only the inference of the subjective state of
mind of the defendant editor is discoverable.9 6

The reckless disregard test presents many of the same problems as
a standard of proof.97

The test amounts to negligence raised to a

higher power and requires that the publication be made with a high
degree of awareness of probable falsehood. 98 The publisher must in

fact have entertained serious doubts as to the truth and accuracy of his
91. Id. at 155. Note however, that "a responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but
press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be
legislated." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
92. See, eg., Weaver v. Prior Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d. 967, 974 (Okla. 1977); Gobin v. Globe
Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223,-, 531 P.2d. 76, 84 (1975) (involving a private as opposed to public
plaintif). Cf. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 343 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1049 (1970).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 580B, commentsf& g (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
See generally Robertson, supra note 71.
94. Robertson, supra note 71 at 238. Buckley v. Littel, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
involves a situation in which a writer/editor's thoughts, beliefs, and conclusions were applied to
his statements in the determination of actual malice. It is not clear that actual malice could have
been found therein absent direct evidence of those beliefs.
95. Robertson, supra note 71 at 238. In one case the jury inferred actual malice from a
predetermined attitude where the defendant added innuendos to certain quoted statements and
quoted others out of context to support a predetermined result based on defendant's biased attitude. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324,337 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
In a close case, such considerations may in fact constitute permissible editorial judgment.
96. Doubt may still exist as to whether this is a blessing or a curse. Editorial thought may
still be chilled where it is recognized that externalities may be damaging or ambiguous. In such
an instance, the editorial process, upon waiver of the privilege, may constitute the primary de-.
fense.
97. See note 84 supra in which the trial court in Herbertcharacterizes this element as highly
subjective.
98. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967). For a detailed, mathematically precise, practically imprecise exploration of the difficulties of the reckless disregard standard, see Note, Constitutional
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statements, such that publication in the face of those doubts demonstrates a reckless disregard for the truth and, therefore, actual malice. 99
The surface level problem with such a test is that it may encourage
publishers not to investigate since the less an editor knows the better. 1 0
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declared that this is the price to
be paid for first amendment protections. 101 Finally, it should be noted
that lower courts have interpreted the reckless disregard standard as
being contrasted with the protected utterances honestly believed. As
such, statements made in reckless disregard for the truth potentially
must be the equivalent of a calculated falsehood' 0 2 -a very high standard indeed.
From the foregoing, the clear call for a subjective state of mind
requirement of actual malice is not without contradiction but the
weight of authority supports it. As such it appears to collide with the
decision in Herbert. On the one hand, actual malice is determined by
a subjective state of mind; on the other, direct inquiry into the workings
of that state of mind is precluded by the new editorial process privilege.
But this collision may be more imaginary than real. A careful reading
of the case indicates that thefacts which give rise to a state of mind are
fully discoverable. It is the manner and the journalistic environment
in which those facts are edited that are immune from judicial secondguessing. To do otherwise would be to chill the most vital and elemental constituent of the press.
The dissent objects to this analysis. Indeed, it holds that the
whole purpose of a libel action is to expose the defendant's subjective
state of mind to the light of judicial review. It was noted that "obviously such a review will have a chilling effect. It is supposed to. The
publication of lies should be discouraged."'' 0 3 The dissent contends
that the attempt of the majority to reduce the chill of judicial inquiry is
not supportable in either precedent or logic."° As to the former, the
Law-Torts-Defamationand the FirstAmendment: The Elements and Application ofthe Reckless
DisregardTest, 50 N.C. L. REv. 390 (1972).

99. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
100. See Robertson, supra note 71 at 240.
101. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,731-32 (1968). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 79 (1964).
102. Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d. 975, -, 269 N.Y.S.2d. 11, 19 (Sup. Ct.
1966). Compare Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) in which Time's deliberate editorial
choice to omit the word "allegedly" did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the truth. Id.

at 290-92.
103. 568 F.2d at 995. The dissent adds that discovery of an editor's state of mind will not chill
freedom of the press any more than is currently being done under New York Times. Id.
104. Id. at 995-97.
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dissent is correct. It is a case of first impression. The careful and narrow reading by the dissent of the cases relied upon by the majority

supports the view that no court has ever found an editorial privilege
prior to Herbert. However, the dissent cites no authority for its own
pronouncements nor for its conclusion that judicial review of an editor's thought processes is the purpose of a libel0 5action which, further,
should chill the exercise of editorial judgment.1

An Alternative Approach to the EditorialPrivilege

The concurring opinion details an alternative approach, also
through first amendment analysis, to reach the same conclusion. The
concurrence cites at the outset the familiar landmarks of limitations on
some forms of discovery as applied to the press10 6 as well as the guiding

principles of the first amendment. Thereafter, the analysis differs from
that of the foregoing opinion.
Relying upon a rationale proposed by Mr. Justice Stewart, 0 7 the
concurrence noted a trend in first amendment interpretation which is

characterized by a structural, institutional differentiation between freedom of speech and freedom of the press.108 It is the press as a constitu105. Id. at 997.
106. First under the general "oppression" or "undue burden" provision of FED. R. Civ. P.
26(c), and secondly using the qualified limitations on discovery of confidential sources. Id. at
986.
107. Stewart, supra note 17.
Most of the other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific liberties or specific
rights of individuals: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right to counsel, the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, to name a few. In contrast, the Free
Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in short,
the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.
This basic understanding is essential, I think, to avoid an elementary error of constitutional law. It is tempting to suggest that freedom of the press means only that newspaper publishers are guaranteed freedom of expression. They are guaranteed that
freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because of the Free Speech Clause. If the Free
Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional
redundancy ...
It is also a mistake to suppose that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee
of a free press is to insure that a newspaper will serve as a neutral forum for debate, a
"market place for ideas," a kind of Hyde Park comer for the community. A related
theory sees the press as a neutral conduit of information between the people and their
elected leaders. These theories, in my view, again give insufficient weight to the institutional autonomy of the press that it was the purpose of the Constitution to guarantee. ...
The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . . to
create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three
official branches.
Id. at 633-34. But see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1426-1429 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (arguing against this interpretation).
108. In short, the press is akin to a fourth branch of government and would have privileges of
the nature afforded those branches. Yasser, supra note 58, at 623 n. 119.
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tionally mandated fourth branch of government which the concurrence
sees emerging from the primary cases relied upon by the court, namely,
Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo1°9 and Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee."' Freedom of the
press is recognized as central to the integral operations of government,"'I and Tornillo and Columbia Broadcastingreflect the inviolability of the editorial function in that process." 2 The rationale behind
the firmly entrenched doctrine against prior restraints" 3 is seen as
equally applicable to all restraints of the crucial process of editorial
judgement." 4 Ultimately, it is the looming threat of self-censorship by
the press that forces the majority to reject any compromise short of an
absolute editorial process privilege against discovery)' 5 The end
product of that process is fully discoverable, but the full scope of the
6
editorial judgment which produced it is free from judicial scrutiny.'1
The dissent questions the concurring judge's distinction between
personal liberties of free speech and institutional liberties of freedom of
the press." 7 Moreover, the dissent is loathe to see the recognition of a
privilege for the press similar to that which exists for the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government, based on the structural theory of the first amendment which finds the press analogous to a
fourth branch of government. 1" This reluctance to grant such consti109. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
110. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
I11.New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring);
United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1142 (2d Cir. 1972).
112. 568 F.2d at 988.
113. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
114. 568 F.2d at 990. "A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth
of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in
amount-leads to. . . 'self-censorship.' " New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964). See generally Anderson, supra note 1.
115. 568 F.2d at 992-95.
116. Id. at 993. In 1971, a Congressional House subcommittee subpoenaed CBS notes and
"outtakes" involved in the production of their network documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon." CBS News President Frank Stanton refused on first amendment grounds, pointing out that
the issue at hand was one of news judgments and editing. If they were subject to subpoena
actions by the federal government who licenses the broadcasters, the effect would be particularly
chilling. The subcommittee threatened Stanton with contempt of Congress but it was not forthcoming. Devol, PriorRestraint, MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT, 20, 30-31 (1971).
'"Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right!" which encompasses 'the
117.
right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph"' as well as that of 'the
large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photo-composition methods."' " 568 F.2d at
997, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 704 (1972) quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450 (1938). However, the concurrence denies drawing such a distinction between an individual
and institutional "press.' Id. at 994 n.34.
118. Id.
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tutional privileges is supported by a comparison of Branzburg v.
Hayes"' with NAMCP v. Alabama

0

by which the dissent concludes

that constitutional privileges must be supported by explicit proof of
chilling and not the imagination of judges. 12 ' But having already admitted the chilling effect which would be present upon the press where
editorial discretion is subject to judicial review, the dissent proves (or at
least pleads) too much when it denies as imaginary its own admission.' 22
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court wisely granted certiorari upon
the important issue of the editorial process privilege found in Herbert.
Thereunder, a plaintiff may discover what an editor knew, said, saw,
and wrote. But the plaintiff may not seek through discovery the opinions, thoughts, beliefs, and conclusions held by that editor as he sought
to meld the underlying facts into that which we know as news. The
editorial process privilege, according to the court in Herbert,is born of
and nurtured by the first amendment protection of freedom of the
press. The Supreme Court has never found an evidentiary privilege
for members of the press residing in the first amendment, but it is submitted that the instant case is compelling in that regard.
The Court must once again rule on the New York Times actual
malice rule in defamation. It is submitted that the Supreme Court will
recognize the soundness of the decision in Herbert and affirm, for, in
the final analysis, editorial judgment and the processes involved therein
are the most basic and elemental ingredients of the press. The press
could survive without presses or cameras; it could survive without tablets or tabloids; it could even survive without reporters. But it could
not survive without the judgmental process known as editing.
Whether it occurs in paneled board rooms, at the city desk or in the
mind of some modem-day Thomas Paine, the editorial process is the
first amendment. Protection from judicial inquiry must, therefore, rise
to the stature of a constitutional privilege to prevent chilling by selective inquiry. To preserve a free and robust press, an editor must be
free to probe, to hypothesize, to challenge, to critique, and to postulate
alternatives without the fear that the lens of judicial scrutiny will focus
119. 408 U.S. 665, 693-95 (1972).
120. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
121. 568 F.2d at 998.

122. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
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upon the elements of the editorial process. To do otherwise would
chill the press intolerably. The press is responsible for its publications;
not for the copy on the newsroom floor or for the internal machinations
or inner-most thoughts of an editor in the process of editing.
An afirmance by the Supreme Court will do much to insure the
autonomy of editorial thought while attaching protections to the most
necessary component of the journalistic enterprise. The free exchange
of ideas in the newsroom and their unencumbered evaluation in the
mind of an editor is wisely afforded constitutional protection.
Tyrus V Dah, Jr.
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